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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In concluding his lectures, Mr. Justice Roberts asserts that "progressively,
the Supreme Court has limited and surrendered the role the Constitution was
intended to confer upon it... the sharp division of powers intended has become
blurred ... doctrines... have more and more circumscribed the pristine powers
of the states, which were intended to be reserved to them by the Constitution..
Considering the topics covered by the lectures, it seems that these strictures do not
apply to the Court's sweeping curtailment of inter-governmental immunities from
taxation. In so far as these conclusions involve the expansion of the federal com-
merce power, many readers will feel that this invasion of the powers of the states
was not only a necessary but also a proper consequence of a widespread demand
for uniform standards "for what was in effect a unified economy.' And in respect
to the impairment of federalism through the established interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, many readers will feel that Mr. Justice Roberts is merely re-
viving the attempt of the Supreme Court in the post-bellum days to read the
Fourteenth Amendment out of the Constitution as far as possible, because to give
it its obvious and intended effect would enlarge the protective powers of the
Federal Government.
Jacob D. Hyman*
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw. By Kenneth Culp Davis. St. Paul, Minnesota. West Pub-
lishing Company. 1951. Pp. XVI, 1024.
To most practicing lawyers, administrative law has been a forbidding field
which they feared to enter but could not avoid. The problems of administrative
law could not be fitted into familiar legal patterns, yet the field seemed to lack
a structure of its own. Relevant precedents were elusive, for until recently the
digest systems and encyclopedias have ignored its presence as a separate field.
Law School casebooks provided a semblance of order, and law review articles pro-
vided penetrating insights into particular problems, but no comprehensive and
systematic treatment was available.
For lawyers lost in the wilderness of administrative law, Professor Davis'
book will come as a welcome guide. It provides a framework which organizes
the subject matter into an intelligible and workable body of law. It presents a
detailed analysis of the major problems of administrative law, and is carefully
documented with all of the leading and most recent cases. Above all, it is thought-
provoking and readable.
Professor Davis has not attempted to provide a handbook on the procedures
13. P. 95.
*Professor of Law University of Buffalo.
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or internal organization of particular agencies. He is primarily concerned with
the legal limitations governing those administrative procedures through which
regulatory policies are determined and individual cases decided. After brief treat-
ment of the problems relating to the delegation of legislative power and to the
power of agencies to make investigations, he turns to the main task of examining
the judicially enforced rules which circumscribe the processes by which agency
decisions are made.
The procedures for rule-making are treated separately from the procedures
for adjudication, although the author recognizes that these two basic types of de-
cision-making frequently shade indistinguishably into each other. The necessity
for a hearing in rule-making, and the special types of hearing suitable for this
process are acutely discussed. The distinctions between interpretative rules and
legislative rules is set forth and the problems of retroactive rules considered.
The central core of the book, however, deals with adjudicatory procedures.
Here are discussed the multitude of smaller problems-the type of notice re-
quired, the right to intervention, the functions of hearing officers, and the require-
ment of intermediate or proposed findings. The author deals more extensively
with some of the larger problems-the use of subordinates in decision-making,
the effect of bias in the deciding officers, the separation of prosecuting and judg-
ing functions, the admissibility of evidence, the use of facts known to the agency
but not included in the record, and the necessity for findings of fact and reasons
for *the decision.
The final third of the book deals with the manifold aspects of judicial re-
view. The author here presents an extremely detailed and helpful analysis of
those difficult problems which a lawyer faces when he seeks judicial relief from
agency action-what action is reviewable and what action is non-reviewable, what
administrative remedies must first be exhausted, who has standing to challenge
agency action, what procedure can be used to obtain review, and what will be
the scope of review.
This brief summary of the contents of the book makes dear that its chief
characteristic is its comprehensiveness. However, two other characteristics which
distinguish it from most treatises need to be mentioned. First, it does not attempt
to state definitive rules of law. Professor Davis well recognizes that administra-
tive law can not be reduced to black letter type. He continually emphasizes that
the procedure of each agency must be adapted to the special task to be performed.
These variations in procedure make impossible fixed rules of law. Even general
principles of fair hearing may have no application. Thus, the right of confron-
tation and cross examination may be meaningless in determining eligibility for
social security benefits; the right to a public hearing would scarcely be sought
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by a bank whose financial soundness was being questioned; and a quarantine
against smallpox may be imposed with no hearing whatsoever. The author forcibly
demonstrates that even the Administrative Procedure Act with its broad statement
of principles and numerous exceptions may, in some situations become unduly
binding. His significant achievement is that in spite of this uncertainty and
flexibility in the field he has been able to enunciate the competing considerations
faced by the courts in enforcing legal limitations on procedures, to suggest the
relative weights given those considerations, and to thereby construct from the
hodge-podge of decisions a reasonably intelligible body of law.
The second distinguishing feature of this book is that it is n~t purely descrip-
tive, but attempts to present a critical evaluation of both administrative procedures
and judicial control. The author accepts government by administrative agencies as in-
evitable, but he does not hesitate to condemn the tendency on the part of some
agencies to take unneccessary procedural short-cuts, or to urge that some should
climb out of their timeworn ruts and develop more adequate procedures. He
also criticizes the courts for their frequent unsteadiness in being either blindly
intolerant or dangerously indulgent of administrative agencies, and for their fail-
ure to state honestly and dearly the real basis for their decisions.
The book is marred only by a certain unevenness of approach. Most of the
chapters were first published as separate law review articles over a period of eight
years. Although the author has brought the material up to date, he has not made
the major revisions which would be necessary to make the chapters fit smoothly
together. For example, the chapter on rule-making presents a critical analysis
of the procedures used by various agencies, with the emphasis on the wisdom of
those procedures. The succeeding chapter on adjudication procedures presents a
bare statement of the minimum standards enforced by the court. This shift in
the level of approach gives an appearance of tacit approval to questionable prac-
tices tolerated by the Courts.
Many of the author's conclusions are, of course, highly debatable. His analy-
sis of some problems is not as thorough and clarifying as one might wish. He
does not attempt to grapple with some of the underlying questions of adminis-
trative law such as what special qualifications do courts have which justify them in
asserting the power to supervise administrative action, and to what extent should
procedures bE designed to protect individuals against the mere possibility of arbi-
trary action even at the expense -of agency effectiveness. However, these are
almost inescapable limitations in this kind of a work, and in no way detract from
the real contribution which Professor Davis has made in presenting a systematic
and enlightening study of an otherwise chaotic and obscure field.
Clyde WV. Summers*
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Buffalo
